中国在欧洲投资基础设施的安全影响-马歇尔基金会-2021.9-50页.pdf

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1、Report September 2021 The Security Implications of Chinese Infrastructure Investment in Europe Dario Cristiani, Mareike Ohlberg, Jonas Parello-Plesner, and Andrew Small Washington, DC Ankara Belgrade Berlin Brussels Bucharest Paris WarsawWashington, DC Ankara Belgrade Berlin Brussels Bucharest Paris

2、 Warsaw September 2021 Report 2Cristiani, Ohlberg, Parello-Plesner, and Small : The Security Implications of Chinese Infrastructure Investment in Europe TABLE OF CONTENTS 3 Summary 5 Introduction Andrew Small 8 Germany and its Neighbors Mareike Ohlberg 22 Italy and the Mediterranean Dario Cristiani

3、35 The Nordic Countries Jonas Parello-Plesner 45 Conclusion September 2021 Report 3Cristiani, Ohlberg, Parello-Plesner, and Small : The Security Implications of Chinese Infrastructure Investment in Europe SUMMARY Even before the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provided additional clarity about Chinas

4、 strategic intent, Europe had experienced major influxes of Chinese finance, used to snap up everything from fading brands to large-scale infrastructure assets. The EU and many European states have already expedited their plans to strengthen or launch investment-screening processes. Yet Europe is st

5、ill in the early stages of determining the right balance of security, openness, and economic resilience when it comes to Chinas economic presence. Many investment-screening mechanisms are new or untested. Debates over how far strategic infrastructure should be viewed through a military security pris

6、m continue apace in NATO. Chinas “dual circulation” plans for its domestic economy, which signal a more radical approach to self-sufficiency for itself and dependency for others, are still in their embryonic phase, as is European thinking about how to adjust policy in light of it. Through the analys

7、is of three emblematic case studies, this report takes stock of the situation and highlights commonalities in Beijings approach to infrastructure investment in Europe. The first case is Germany and its neighbors. Germany remains the economic locus for much of the wider region, and is the dominant ac

8、tor for the European economy as a whole, which gives outsized weight to national and sub-national choices in the country about how to deal with Chinese economic actors. While specific industrial sectors continue to deepen their commercial ties, concern from important sections of industry about the s

9、ystemic impact of Chinese economic and political practices has arguably had the single greatest impact on the changing nature of the European debate on China. The second case is Italy and the wider Mediterranean region. Southern Europe was the locus of the biggest wave of Chinese investments in sens

10、itive sectors during the eurozone crisis. Many saw Italys willingness to sign up to the BRI in 2019 as simply a repeat of the Greek and Portuguese experience earlier. Yet, the picture has proved vastly more complex. Membership of BRI, far from resulting in a deepening of Sino-Italian rela- tions saw